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Abstract 
 In this paper we investigate the relationship 
between the quality of governance, the business 
environment and foreign direct investments. 
Looking at 49 countries in Africa, we present 
evidence supporting the claim that the quality of 
governance does affect the stability of policies and 
the quality of the business environment. However, 
our data analysis also reveals that neither the 
quality of governance nor the quality of the 
business environment have any impact, at least in 
Sub-Saharan Africa on the level of FDI.  
1  Introduction 
Several studies published in the course of the past twenty years have 
shown that governance matters, that corruption has major 
socio-economic costs and that good governance yields some important 
developmental dividends (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2013). 
Given the importance of governance, several efforts have been made 
to conceptualize and operationalize governance. The World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) represents one of the most methodologically 
sophisticated efforts to track the quality of governance in the world and 
the data generated by WGI have been used extensively to understand the 
causes, the consequences and the correlates of good governance. The 
literature that was produced using these data documented the 
relationship between governance and various developmental indicators. 
Governance was highly correlated with and possibly responsible for 
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income per capita, infant mortality, and adult literacy according to 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999), income Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005), inequality Pelizzo (2012) and for the 
modernization of the labour force Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2013).  
Governance matters because where governance is poor there are, as 
(Gray and Kaufman, 1998) point out, higher transaction costs, 
misallocation of resources, lower ability to raise taxes, higher taxes, 
lower investments in education and a suboptimal provision of public 
goods. Worst of all, the absence of good governance ”impedes long-term 
foreign and domestic investment” ( Gray and Kaufman, 1998, 1). In 
other words, by reducing the level of investments and misallocating 
resources, low quality governance slows down growth, prevents growth 
from being sustainable, and prevents countries from becoming properly 
developed. 
The literature on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) on the African 
continent has, however, often spoken of a sort of “African 
exceptionalism,” —that is, the patterns, levels, and flows of FDI into the 
African continent do not seem to respond to the same factors that affect 
FDI worldwide. Building on this literature, in this note we wish to test 
whether and to what extent the level of FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
affected by the quality of governance and by the quality of the business 
environment, like in the rest of the world, or whether even in this regard 
we can get detect some degree of African exceptionalism. 
2  Governance 
In a much celebrated paper that appeared in Political Studies, Rhodes 
(1996) argues that while very popular the term ‘governance’ was not 
terribly precise, it is used to denote or a synonymous of “the minimal 
state, corporate governance, the new public management, ‘good 
governance’, socio-cybernetic systems, and self-organizing networks”. 
Rhodes (1996) goes on to argue that governance as good governance 
referred to the use of power to run a country’s affairs, that good 
governance could manifest itself on various level (systemic, political, 
administrative), and that it was regarded by the World Bank and other 
international institutions as one of the most important, if not the most 
important, determinant of socio-economic development.
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While scholars and practitioners have generally supported the claim 
that governance matters, that good governance is a major determinant of 
growth, and while it has been extensively documented that international 
organizations regard the promotion of good governance principles as an 
essential component of any successful developmental strategy, there has 
been little agreement as to how exactly governance and good 
governance should be conceptualized. 
The notion of good governance has been used in association with 
three different, though possibly related, meanings. First of all, in some 
writings, even in those that acknowledged the multidimensional 
character of good governance, good governance was often reduced to the 
absence of corruption–which is why, in this line of scholarship, the 
dividends of good governance or the costs of corruption (Gray and 
Kaufman, 1998; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2013) have at times been 
treated as two sides of the same coin. Second, some writings have treated 
good governance as the ensemble of practices and procedures that make 
government representative, accountable, responsive and decisive 
(Kaufmann, 2005). And since democratic rule or democracy is precisely 
that political system in which rulers by representing the will of the 
electorate, to which they respond, have a mandate to make decisions on 
behalf of the electorate to address the electorate’s needs and concerns, it 
is clear that democracy is fairly similar, if not identical, to good 
governance. The third conceptualization of governance envisions or 
treats good governance as a form of governing where the government 
governs and takes decisions in the interest of the population, regardless 
of whether and to what extent it is representative. 
In one sense good governance is a corruption-free mode of 
governing, in another sense good governance is simply democratic 
governance, while in the third sense good governance refers to the fact 
that it is possible to govern well in settings that are imperfectly 
representative and democratic. These three conceptualizations of good 
governance ascribe the good quality of governance to either its 
non-corrupt, or democratic or technically proficient nature, yet, because 
of their reductionism they provide a rather inadequate depiction of 
governance and its qualities.  
Documents generated by international organizations have almost 
always acknowledged the fact that governance and good governance are 
multi–dimensional as they pertain to and reflect a plurality of qualities 
and characteristics. For the IMF, good governance is a corruption free, 
efficient, accountable type of government that respects the rule of law.
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For the UN, good governance is a type of governance that is respectful of 
the rule of law, but also participatory, transparent, accountable, 
responsive, efficient and effective, equitable and inclusive, and 
consensus-oriented.
5
 While for the World Bank, good governance could 
be identified in countries with a strong civil society, accountable 
government, professional bureaucracy, the rule of law, and where 
decisions are taken in an open and predictable fashion.
6
  
In spite of their differences, these three definitions or 
conceptualizations of governance agree on two basic points: first, good 
governance is a multidimensional or multifaceted phenomenon, and, 
second, governance cannot be good in the absence of some level of 
representativeness, responsiveness and responsibility. 
These three characteristics can be used to map the universe of 
governance as shown in Table 1. 
 
 Representative Responsive Responsible 
  Good governance + + + 
 Irresponsive democracies + – + 
 Populist authoritarian – + – 
 Soft authoritarian, 
performance-oriented 
– + + 
 Technocratic authoritarian – – + 
 Dysfunctional democracies + – – 
 Populist democracies + + – 
 Poor governance – – – 
Table 1: Mapping Governence 
In countries where the exercise of authority is representative, 
responsive and responsible governance is good, while in countries where 
the exercise of authority lacks each of these characteristics governance is 
bad. Between these two extremes, our taxonomy identifies a wide range 
of possible options. Our taxonomy identifies countries in which the 
exercise of authority is representative, but not terribly responsive nor 
responsible—a category that could be regarded as including all the 
dysfunctional democracies where elections are held, democratic leaders 
are selected, but where the government is unable to address citizens’ 
demands or to promote society’s collective well-being. There are 
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countries where the exercise of authority is both representative and 
responsive, but irresponsible, as in the case of democracies with populist 
rulers. There are countries where authority is exercised very responsibly, 
without being either representative or responsive-which is what we find 
in technocratic authoritarian regimes. There are countries where 
authority is responsive and responsible, but inadequately representative, 
and this is the case of soft-authoritarian, performance-oriented rulers. 
And there are authoritarian regimes, that in their efforts to satisfy citizen 
demands, take decisions that are detrimental for the society’s well-being. 
The recognition that governance is multifaceted or multidimensional 
and that governance dimensions or sub-dimensions could be orthogonal 
to one another has led analysts to devise multidimensional frameworks 
for assessing the quality of governance worldwide.
7
 For instance, in 
what possibly represents the most comprehensive–if not the best– effort 
to date to track the quality of governance worldwide, Kaufmann and his 
collaborators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999) proposed to 
measure the level of governance on the basis of six indicators: political 
stability, the absence of politically motivated violence; government 
effectiveness, which referred to a government’s ability to design and 
implement policies; voice and accountability, which were used to 
measure the representativeness and the accountability of government; 
the ability to control corruption; and respect for the rule of law.  
These dimensions and indicators have been extensively employed in 
a wide range of analyses and previous studies have consistently shown 
that, regardless of which governance measure is used and regardless of 
how socio-economic development is operationalized, the quality of 
governance and the level of socio-economic development are strongly 
related to one another. Better governance is associated with greater 
wealth, longer life expectancy, higher adult literacy, lower infant 
mortality, and a more modern economy (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2013). 
The association between these two sets of variables may not prove 
causation and, above all, may not prove conclusively the direction of 
causality—that is, whether more developed countries have better 
governance because they are developed or whether because better 
governance promotes development as Kaufmann and his collaborators 
have suggested for the past two decades. 
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3  Data, sources and analyses 
In order to test whether and to what extent there good governance has 
business implications, we will explore the relationship between the six 
indicators of good governance devised by Kaufmann and his 
collaborators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999) and, 
respectively, the stability of policies, the quality of the business 
environment and the level of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). 
The six governance indicators are political stability, control of 
corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, and 
government effectiveness. The data for each of these indicators are taken 
from the World Governance Indicators. The values for each of the 
governance indicators vary from a minimum of −2.50 to a maximum of 
2.5. FDI is measured on the basis of the net inflows (new investments 
â€“ disinvestments) as percentage of a country’s GDP. The data are 
taken from the World Bank’s Word Development Indicators Dataset. 
The short-term policy continuity (STPC) is measured on the basis of 
a 100-point scale constructed by the Business Monitor International 
(BMI) which assigns a score of 100 to a country with the highest 
possible level of policy stability and which assigns a score of 0 to a 
country where policies have the highest possible level of instability and 
volatility. 
The quality of the business environment is also measured by BMI on 
the basis of a 100 point scale, where 100 indicates the best and 0 
indicates the worst business environment. 
In the course of this analysis we will use the data collected in 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, 
Congo Kinshasa, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibuti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Somaliland, South Africa, South 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
The data collected in these 49 countries shows that in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, there is a good level of policy continuity, but there is also a great 
deal of variation in policy continuity across various countries. In fact, 
policy continuity varies from a minimum of 10 registered in Mali in 
2012 to a maximum of 95 registered in Senegal. 
The data on the quality of the business environment displays a rather 
different picture. In our sample, the quality of the business environment 
is generally disappointing. It varies greatly from a minimum of 19.6 
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registered in Chad to a maximum of 61.8 recorded in Mauritius—with 
an average of just 34.92 per cent. 
The data on FDI reveal that there is an incredibly high level of 
variation in Sub Saharan Africa. In fact, FDI varied from a minimum of 
−6% (which means that disinvestments greatly exceeded new 
investments) in Angola to a maximum of 78.1% recorded in Liberia. The 
variation is so great that the standard deviation greatly exceeds the value 
of the continental mean. 
The descriptive statistics (Table 2) paint a bleak picture of the level 
of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The mean score for each of the six 
indicators is solidly negative which means that regardless of how one 
measures governance or regardless of what aspect of governance one 
looks at, the result is consistently that governance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is poor. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are politically unstable, unable 
to curb corruption, poorly representative as evidenced by a fairly low 
score in terms of voice and accountability, have rather ineffective 
governments, have poor regulatory quality and they are generally 
disrespectful of the rule of law.  
The data also reveal that for each of the governance scores there is 
considerable variation, which means that while some countries have 
moderately high levels of governance, other countries have some of the 
lowest levels of governance in the world. For further details see Table 2.  
 Min Max Mean s.d. 
  STPC 10 95 58.7 21.06 
Business environment 19.6 61.8 34.92 8.46 
FDI -6.0 78.1 7.14 12.42 
Political stability -2.27 1.11 -.46 .88 
Control of corruption -1.56 .94 -.63 .61 
Voice and accountability -1.87 .95 -.60 .70 
Government effectiveness -1.66 .93 -.75 .60 
Regulatory quality -1.83 .98 -.61 .58 
Rule of law -1.65 .94 -.69 .59 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Governance indicators have generally been recognized as major 
determinants of socio-economic development. In this paper, we want to 
test instead how they relate to the business environment and how 
governance conditions and business environment affect FDI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  
  STPC   Bus. Env.   FDI  
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Political stability  
(.000)
.65  
(.000)
.55  
(.944)
.01  
Control of 
corruption  (.004)
.42  
(.000)
.55  
(.944)
.01  
Voice and 
accountability  (.001)
.48  
(.000)
.65  
(.999)
.00  
Government 
effectiveness  (.000)
.54  
(.000)
.87  
(.293)
.16  
Regulatory quality  
(.000)
.54  
(.000)
.79  
(.253)
.17  
Rule of law  
(.000)
.57  
(.000)
.81  
(.515)
.10  
STPC  1 
(.003)
.43  
(.126)
.24  
Business 
Environment  
 1 
(.198)
.20  
FDI    1 
Table 3: Correlation analysis (.sig) 
The results of the correlation analysis reveal that all the governance 
coefficients are strongly correlated with the STPC and to the quality of 
the business environment, that STPC is more sensitive to changes in the 
level of political stability than to changes in any other facet of 
governance, while the quality of the business environment is more 
sensitive to changes in the level of government effectiveness. And 
insofar as it is possible to postulate the existence of a causal link between 
governance indicators and policy continuity or quality of the business 
environment, political stability is the single most important determinant 
of policy continuity while government effectiveness is the most 
important predictor of the quality of the business environment. 
Since the literature has generally posited that political instability and 
political risk are intimately tied with the quality of governance, that poor 
governance has a destabilizing effect on political systems, and that 
political instability affects the level of foreign direct investments (Busse 
and Hefeker, 2007), the outcomes of foreign direct investments (Clark, 
1997), investment strategies Cosset and Suret (1995) and ultimately 
economic growth (Alesina and Perotti, 1994), it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that variation in the governance indicators, in the policy 
continuity and in the quality of the business environment are strongly 
related to or have a major impact on the level of FDI in a given country. 
The results of the correlation analysis tells a rather different story. 
There is no significant relationship between the net inflow of FDI and 
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the quality of governance, policy continuity or the quality of the business 
environment. If the correlation coefficients were not insignificant, the 
results of the correlation analyses would suggest that the net inflow of 
FDI as percentage of a country’s GDP are inversely related to the 
government effectiveness, the regulatory quality, the level of rule of law, 
the continuity of policies and the quality of the business environment. In 
other words, if the correlation coefficients were significant, they would 
indicate that countries with more unstable, more unregulated, more 
ineffective political systems are more attractive for investors than 
countries with more stable, more effective, and more properly 
functioning political systems. 
The fact that correlation coefficients are, instead, insignificant only 
allows us to say that the volume of FDI is not meaningfully affected, one 
way or another, by either the quality of governance however measured, 
the continuity of policies and the quality of the business environment. 
To analyze the issue further, we employed regression analysis, for 
which the results are summarized in Table 4.  
 
  Dependent variable  
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)  
Regressors   STPC   Bus. Env.   FDI   FDI   FDI   FDI  
Political stability   
(.004)
*12.97    
(.961)
.05    
(.598)
.78    —   —   — 
Control of 
corruption  
 
(.079)
*15.13   (.002)
*5.38    
(.211)
7.84         
Voice and 
accountability  
 
(.663)
2.81   
(.928)
.13    
(.301)
5.82         
Government 
effectiveness  
 
(0.725)
4.61   
(.000)
*14.12    
(.262)
10.51         
Regulatory quality   
(0.422)
.54    
(.309)
2.80    
(.279)
7.45         
Rule of law   
(0.439)
.57    
(.763)
.97    
(.888)
.91         
STPC   —   —   —   
(.284)
.05   
(.126)
.07    —  
Business 
Environment  
 —   —   —   
(.486)
.09    —   
(.198)
.15   
2R    .495   .805   .142   .068   .056   .040  
2.RAdj    .414   .774   .006   .021   .033   .017  
Number of 
observations  
 44   44   45   43   43   43  
*
 indcates statistical significance at 10 % level. Heteroskeasdicity-robust p -values are in paranthesis. 
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Table 4: Regression analysis 
Columns (1) and (2) support our conclusion above that the governance 
coefficients are strongly correlated with the STPC and to the quality of 
the business environment. In Regression 1, this correlation is captured 
by the coefficient of political stability and control of corruption. The 
negative coefficient of control of corruption is rather surprising, but that 
is entirely due to the high correlation between the regressors. Indeed, 
when we check the variance inflation factors, we detect high degree of 
collinearity. If we regress STPC individually on the governance 
variables (see the scatter plots in the Appendix), we conclude a positive 
relationship between STPC and governance variables.  
In Regression 3 (Column 3 in Table 4) we confirm our earlier 
conclusion that none of the political variables has a significant 
relationship with FDI. We further check this result by regressing FDI on 
STPC and quality of business environment together (Regression 4) and 
separately (Regression 5 and 6). We again see that none of the regressors 
are statistically significant. Furthermore, in all regressions with FDI as 
independent variable, R
2
 values are significantly low, and the adjusted 
R
2
 values drop sharply.  
Why there is no significant relationship between good governance, 
quality of the business environment and policy stability on the one hand 
and FDI on the other hand? 
4  Discussion 
There are at least three different, and possibly related, reasons why FDI 
in Africa does not seem to be affected by the quality of governance 
however measured, by policy stability and by the quality of the business 
environment. 
The first explanation is that Africa is different. In a pioneering study 
of FDI in the African continent, Asiedu (2002) reports that Africa was 
exceptional in several respects. First of all, in spite of a boom in FDI, 
Africa, which was then the poorest region in the world, was not as 
successful as other regions in attracting FDI. Second, factors that were 
responsible for the flow of FDI to non-Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
were not responsible for the flow of FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
example, Asiedu (2002) reports that while higher returns on capital 
promoted FDI to non Sub-Saharan Africa countries, they did not do so in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly infrastructure development was a 
determinant of FDI to non-Sub-Saharan Africa countries but not to 
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Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Africa is different. The logic that governs 
FDI in Africa may not be the same logic that governs FDI in other 
regions of the world and this could explain why instability and 
corruption deter foreign investors out of Sub-Saharan Africa but not in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The second explanation is that Africa is a rapidly changing continent 
and that factors that affect FDI at one point in time, may not be 
significant at a different point in time. The comparison of two papers by 
Asiedu (2002, 2006) allow us to illustrate this point. In the 2002 paper 
Asiedu claims that infrastructure and political instability did not have a 
significant impact on FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa. In her 2006 paper, she 
noted instead that the inflow of FDI was affected not only by market 
size, natural resource endowments, and the presence of efficient legal 
systems, but also by infrastructure, instability and corruption, which, in 
her previous study, did not appear to play any role. If the first 
explanation is that Africa is different, the second is that Africa is rapidly 
changing. The implication is that the impact that certain social, political, 
legal factors may have on FDI is not constant, but variable–and it varies 
not simply in degree (more or less) but also in kind 
(significant/insignificant). 
The third explanation is behavioral. Instability, corruption, and the 
poor quality of the business environment do not deter foreign investors. 
There are various reasons why these factors may not deter foreign 
investors. One reason, simply put, is that foreign investors may have no 
alternatives to investing in Sub-Saharan Africa and therefore invest in 
the continent in spite of the fact that it is a riskier business environment 
than other regions. A second reason why foreign investors may not be 
deterred from investing in Sub-Saharan Africa is that by anticipating the 
risks to which they are exposed they can take preventive measures to 
protect their activities and profits from potential risks and threats. For 
instance they can buy insurance to protect their investments or they can 
demand fiscal incentives from host governments (Emel and Huber, 
2008) to counterbalance the possible effects of the anticipated risks. 
Either by insuring their investments or by receiving generous fiscal 
incentives, foreign investors can take steps to protect the profitability of 
their investments and may decide to invest in politically unstable, 
corrupt, environments without jeopardizing their companies’ interests. 
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5  Conclusion 
The purpose of the present note was to test whether and to what extent 
the quality of governance affects the business environment and foreign 
direct investments. The evidence presented here sustains the claim that 
the quality of governance does affect the stability of policies and the 
quality of the business environment. Higher levels of political instability 
and corruption, lower levels of accountability, lower regulatory quality, 
lower government effectiveness and a more inadequate enforcement of 
the rule of law have a negative impact on the policy continuity and on the 
quality of the business environment.  
Our data analysis also reveals that neither the quality of governance 
nor the quality of the business environment have any impact, at least in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, on the level of FDI. While the data at our disposal 
do not allow us to argue conclusively why this may be the case, we used 
some evidence presented and discussed in the literature to formulate 
three educated guesses as to why FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa are not 
affected by either the quality of governance or by the quality of the 
business environment. In doing so, we have noted that Sub-Saharan 
Africa is a rapidly changing political and business environment which 
may respond differently, at different points in time, to similar 
conditions; that Sub-Saharan Africa is exceptional in several respects 
and what accounts for FDI to other regions may not apply in this context; 
and, finally, that foreign investors may not be deterred by the poor 
quality of governance and of the business environment either because 
they have no alternatives or because they take steps to prevent/neutralize 
the problems that they may encounter while running their activities on 
the continent. 
If our last point is correct, the value of governance indicators and 
other estimates of political risks does not consist so much in helping the 
analyst to predict patterns and volumes of FDI, but rather consists in 
providing the business community with the information it requires to 
anticipate the risks it may be exposed to and to protect the profitability of 
its investments.  
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6  Appendix 
6.1  Short-term Policy Continuity 
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6.2  Quality of Business Environment 
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6.3  FDI 
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